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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MAVOR JEAN CARNES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

.
..

vs .
CLIFF

CARJ.~ES

..

,

Case No. 18370

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in the
Third District Court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondent brought an action upon a foreign judgment
against the appellant in the Third District Court.
lant contested the action.

The appel-

Respondent first filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings which was in part denied.

Later, on

March 5, 1982, the court granted the respondent's "motion for
judgment."

On April 5, 1982, the appellant filed his notice of

appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment and
a remand for trial on the disputed factual issues.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case began on April 28, 1981, when the respondent filed
a complaint against the appellant based upon a foreign judgment.
In the complaint the respondent alleged that the Florida court
which entered judgment on November 10, 1980, had acquired personal jurisdiction over the aopellant by means of personal service (R-3, paragraph #4).

The appellant filed an answer which,

among other allegations, denied that he had been served and affirmatively alleged that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the judgment.
On August 25, 1981, the respondent filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (R7-17).

The Court did not grant the motion

because no proof was presented that the appellant had in fact
been served in the Florida action (R-21-22) .
On January 20, 1982, the respondent filed what she styled
as a "motion for judgment" pursuant to Rule 12C of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, again claiming that the appellant had been
properly served in the Florida action (R-23) .

Attached to the

motion was a return of service which purports to show that the
appellant was personally served at 1554 West 8155 South

~73

on

October 22, 1980 with the process which led to the judgment (R-26).
However, an examination of the exhibit shows it was not prepared
until May 22, 1981, six months after the judgment, and according
to the Clerk's stamp in the left corner, was not filed in Florida
-2-
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until November 20, 1981, some one year and ten days after the
entry of judgment and some two months after the Utah court ruled
such a return would be a prerequisite for any judgment.
The Court which heard the "motion for judgment" ordered
that it be continued without date to enable the respondent to
secure additional proof of service (R-30, 36).

Respondent then

filed an affidavit from the same deputy who prepared the May 22,
1981 return, only in this affidavit the deputy claimed to have
served the appellant at his work address, 4950 South 8400 West,
Salt Lake City, Utah (R-32, 33).

The Court then gave the appel-

lant five days to respond to the new affidavit (R-35).
The appellant then filed his own affidavit alleging that
he had never resided at 1554 West 8155 South #73, the first
place at which he was alleged to have been served, that he had
never been served at work and that he had never been served at
all (R-46).
the parties

The Court then considered memoranda submitted by
(R-42, 48, 56) and entered judgment on March 5, 1982

(R-59).

ARGUMENT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD
NOT H.~VE BEEN GRANTED
Summary judgment was inappropriate in this case both as
a matter of fact and and as a matter of law.

A clear issue exists
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as to the central fact in the case, whether the appellant was
served.

In addition, under Florida law no judgment can be entered

without proof of service, yet here the proof was not prepared
for six months after the entry of judgment and was not filed until
more than a year later.

However, before these factual and legal

issues are explored in greater depth, it is first necessary to
determine what type of judgment the court entered.
The determination of what type of judgment was entered is
necessary because the respondent styled her motion only as a
"motion for judgmentu and the court's judgment did not clarify
the type.

The motion was made pursuant to Rule 12C, U.R.C.P.,

thus it apparently began as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, the court did not limit its inquiry to the pleadings
but rather considered the return of service exhibit, the affidavit
of the deputy who claimed to have made the service, and the
affidavit of the defendant who denied service.

Where the court

considers matters outside of the pleadings on a motion made
pursuant to Rule 12, " ... the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 ... ," Rule 12,
U.R.C.P., Strand v. Associated Students of
(Utah 1977).

u.

of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,

Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the

judgment which was entered was a summary judgment.
The principles which guide a court in determining whether
to enter sununary judgment are well known.

"To sustain

a summary

judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the loser, must show that
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there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the winner
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Such showing must

preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that
the loser could win if given a trial", Frederick May & Cornoany v.
Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266

(1962).

" ... It takes only one

sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other
side of the controversy and create an issue of fact ... ,!' Hollbrook
Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).

An application

of these principles to the 9resent appeal discloses one of the
reasons summary judgment was inappropriate.
The respondent's evidence to support service may have been
sufficient alone to preclude summary judgment.

In September, 1981,

the court told the respondent it would not grant judgment absent
sufficient proof that the appellant was served.

Curiously enough,

in November, 1981, two months later and more than a year after the
entry of judgment a return of service appeared for the first time
in the Florida file.

The return wasostensLbly prepared by a Utah

deputy sheriff six months after the entry of judgment and then was
not filed for another six months.

In it the deputy professes to

have served the appellant at a certain residential address in
western Salt Lake County.

Later, when the court pressed the

respondent for further proof of service, the same depQty filed an
affidavit in which he claimed to have served the appellant at a
completely different business address.

These confused and odd

facts offered in support of service are squarely opposed by the
appellant's affidavit.

In it, he claims to have never been served.

He also states that he never lived at the residence where the
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deputy first claimed to have served him and when the deputy
changed his story to claim he served him at work, it turned
out that the appellant was not at work that week.

The appellant's

"one sworn statement" created a clear material issue of fact,
whether he was served, which should have prevented the lower court
from entering summary judgment.
The materiality of the disputed fact cannot be questioned.
It is fundamental that without service of process there can be no
jurisdiction to enter a judgment, Shepherd v. Kellv, 2 Fla. 634
(1849).

In Florida, where this particular judgment arose, the

defendant is permitted to raise lack of appropriate service as a
defense even where a valid sheriff's return has been filed provided
that he bear the burden of persuading the court by clear and
convincing evidence that service did not occur, Mcintosh v. Webbeler,
106 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1958).

Thus the dispute presented by

this appeal is "material."
Summary judgment was improper here not only because of the
dispute as to the facts but as a matter of Florida law.

As has

been seen previously, the return of service on the Florida process
was not created until some six months after the entry of judgment
and was not filed for more than a year after the entry of judgment.
Thus, at the time the judgment was entered proof of any kind that
the appellant had been served did not even exist.
Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767

In Klosenski v.

(Fla. 1959), the Court held that it was

the service of the writ and not the sheriff's return which gave
the court jurisdiction but at the same time it held, "the court
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has not jurisdiction to proceed further in the cause unless and
until proof of valid service has been made," id., at 769, and
concluded that the action would lie dormant until proper proof
was made.

Therefore, in the present case, under unequivocal

Florida law, the court which entered the judgment "lacked
jurisdiction to proceed in the cause" at the time judgment was
entered.

Thus the judgment in Florida was void as a matter of

law and was equally void when suit was broughtupon it here in
Utah.

CONCLUSION
Summary judgment was inappropriate as a matter of fact and
as a matter of law because the fact of service was in dispute
and the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the
District Court.
DATED this

4_3

day of June, 1982.

Respectfully submitted,

E1'WARD K • BRASS
._,,
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed to Paul H. Proctor, 430 Ten Broadway Building,
Ten West Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this
of June, 1982.

/~

,

1

.!;
r;

.,

7 l~lU1t

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

day

